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ERISA Preemption:
Whether State Common Law Doctrines
of Substantial Compliance Fall Under the
Purview of ERISA
BY JENNIFER HOWARD*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Congress enacted the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA") in 1974.1 In general, ERISA
regulates two types of employee benefit plans-pension plans and welfare
plans. The term "welfare plan" covers "a wide variety of benefit programs,
ranging from medical and hospital care to accident, death, disability, and
unemployment benefits," whereas the term "pension plan" refers to "a plan
that provides retirement income to employees."2 One of Congress' goals
when it enacted ERISA was to ensure that employers would not face
''conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit
plans."3 In order to accomplish this goal, ERISA "federalized the law of
pensions and employee benefits by preempting state governance or
regulation."4 Specifically, section 514(a) of ERISA provides that Titles I
and IV "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."5 Not all state laws relating
to employee benefit plans are preempted by ERISA, however, because
"J.D. 2003, University of Kentucky. The author would like to thank Professor
Kathryn Moore for her advice on this Note.
' Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 832 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2003)).
2 BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON ERISA 5 (4th ed. 1993).
' Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 (1983) (quoting 120 CONG.
REC. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams)).
4 LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHERINE MOORE, THE LAW OF EMPLOYEE PEN-
SIONS & WELFARE BENEFITS at 1, ch. 4 (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on file
with author).
' 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
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ERISA also provides a "savings clause" for any state law regulating "insur-
ance, banking, or securities."6 Also, the "deemer clause" in ERISA pulls
self-funded insurance plans back under the umbrella of ERISA preemp-
tion.7
"ERISA is an intricate, comprehensive statute."' Since ERISA's enact-
ment, there has been a great deal of litigation about exactly what ERISA
preempts. Although the United States Supreme Court has ruled on many of
these issues, new issues continue to arise. One such issue is whether state
common law doctrines of substantial compliance are preempted by ERISA.
While the Supreme Court has not issued an opinion regarding such
doctrines, several circuits have dealt with this issue. The circuits are split:
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held that ERISA does preempt state
common law doctrines of substantial compliance, 9 while the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits have held that ERISA does not.' An analysis of past
Supreme Court decisions about preemption and the purposes of ERISA
indicates that the former group reached the correct decision.
Part I of this Note summarizes the relevant background information
regarding ERISA, preemption, federal common law, and the state common
law doctrines of substantial compliance." Part II discusses the circuit
courts' holdings regarding preemption of state common law doctrines of
substantial compliance. 2 Part III argues that ERISA does preempt state
common law doctrines regarding substantial compliance. 13 Finally, Part IV
discusses federal common law of substantial compliance in relation to state
doctrines.14
I. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of ERISA Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides,
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the
6ld. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
7Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
8 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997).
9 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2002); Phoenix
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 561 (4th Cir. 1994).
10 Bankamerica Pension Plan v. McMath, 206 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2001);
Peckham v. Gen. State Mut., 964 F.2d 1043, 1052 (10th Cir. 1992).
"See infra Part I, notes 15-68 and accompanying text.
12 See infra Part II, notes 69-126 and accompanying text.
13 See infra Part III, notes 127-57 and accompanying text.
14 See infra Part IV, notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
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supreme Law of the Land."' 5 While the Clause does not mandate federal
preemption of state law, it does authorize it.' 6 Generally, preemption of
state laws by federal laws may be express or implied and courts look to
Congressional intent to determine whether a state statute should be pre-
empted. 7 The drafters of ERISA explicitly stated that ERISA preempts all
state law relating to employee benefit plans. The legislators specifically
dismissed a limited preemption clause in favor of the broader clause.
18
While this may seem like a clear preemption situation, courts have had
difficulty determining what exactly is preempted by the federal law. 9
Courts have noted that the preemption provisions in ERISA "are not a
model of legislative drafting."2° ERISA explicitly preempts state laws that
are inconsistent with its provisions.2' ERISA also preempts laws addressing
matters it specifically regulates. Because it is much more difficult to
understand what is included in the latter concept, litigation over preemption
continues to arise. In response to the litigation over ERISA's lack of clarity,
federal circuit courts have outlined a process for analyzing preemption. The
Ninth Circuit laid out three types of state laws that are always preempted:
(1) state laws that mandate employee benefit structures or their adminis-
tration; (2) state laws that bind employers or plan administrators to
particular choices or preclude uniform administrative practice, thereby
functioning as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself; and (3) state laws
providing alternate enforcement mechanisms for employees to obtain
ERISA plan benefits.
2 2
Commentators have stated that if "a state law does not fall within one of
these categories, and it is a law of general application, then preemption
'5 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
16 See FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 4, at 1.
" Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983).
'8 Id. at 99 (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen.
Williams)).
'9 See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 839 (1997) (stating that "ERISA pre-
emption questions are recurrent").
2 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,58 (1990) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
2 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2003).
22 JEFFREY LEWIS & MARY ELLEN SIGNORILLE, ERISA Preemption, in THE
ELEVENTH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ERISA LITIGATION 6-7 (2001) (citing
Ariz. State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Citibank, 125 F.3d 715 (9th Cir.
1997)).
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turns on the question of whether the relationship involved is one which is
regulated by ERISA. '23 Still, the question of preemption continues to be
litigated.
By definition, ERISA preempts state law if the provision in question is
a state law that relates to an employee benefit plan. 24 For purposes of
ERISA, "state" means "any State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake
Island, and the Canal Zone, 25 and the term "state law" is comprised of "all
laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of
law. 26 Since the definition of the term "state law" is relatively clear, most
of the litigation surrounding ERISA preemption centers around the phrase
"relate to," from ERISA section 514(a).27
The Supreme Court has interpreted the scope of the phrase "relate to"
differently over the past twenty years. Originally, the phrase was used "in
[its] broad sense. 28 Under the Court's original expansive approach, a law
"related to" an employee benefit plan if it had a "connection with or a
reference to such a plan.' 29 ERISA preempted state law even if no federal
law conflicted with the state provision if the connection or reference was
present.3"
The Court first considered the scope of ERISA's preemption in Alessi
v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. 31 In Alessi, the Court stated, "ERISA makes
clear that even indirect state action bearing on private pensions may
encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern. 32 Since the decision
in Alessi, the Court has held that ERISA preempts state workers' compen-
sation laws that preclude plans from offsetting workers' compensation
awards against pension plans, 33 fair employment laws that prohibit preg-
nancy as a justification for exclusion from disability benefit plans,34 and
state common law causes of action that challenge the improper processing
of claims under ERISA plans.35
231d. at7.
24 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
2 1 Id. § 1002(10).
261 Id. § 1144(c)(1).
27 Id. § 1144(a).
28 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983).
29 Id. at 96-97.
30 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
31 Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
321 Id. at 525.
33 id.
34 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 85.
31 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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The Court's expansive approach was further refined in Mackey v.
Lanier Collection Agency & Service.3 ' In Mackey, the Supreme Court held
that a state law intending to give effect to ERISA's underlying purposes
was preempted. 37 The Court has repeatedly noted Congress' intent for
ERISA to preempt all actions involving employee benefit plans.38 Nonethe-
less, even when the Court interpreted the phrase broadly there were
situations where the Court felt the connection was "too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral" to warrant preemption. 39 According to the Court in Mackey,
preemption did not apply to state law claims against ERISA plans such as
unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or torts committed by the plans.40
Recently the Court has further narrowed the scope of ERISA's
preemption. "Supreme Court decisions.., seem to have 'put the brakes' on
runaway ERISA preemption." 41 Now, "to determine whether a state law has
the forbidden connection, [courts] look to 'the objectives of the ERISA
statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive,' [and] to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA
plans."'42 In New York State Conference ofBlue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a
challenge based on ERISA preemption saying that its earlier holdings
emphasizing the literal meaning of "relate to" were not especially helpful.43
Instead, the Court focused on the objectives of ERISA and the nature and
effect of the state law on ERISA plans. Also, the Court began with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the state would not be
36 Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
37 Id. at 829-30.
38 See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) (holding
that the purpose of the provision is to "ensure that plans and plan sponsors would
be subject to a uniform body of benefits law"); see also Shaw, 463 U.S. at 99
(quoting Senator Williams and Representative Dent about the purposes of the
ERISA legislation).
39 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
40 Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833.
4, LEWIS & SIGNORILLE, supra note 22, at 4.
42 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519
U.S. 316,325 (1997) (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658-59 (1995)). For further discussion
of Congress' purpose in enacting ERISA, see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 8 (1987), where the Supreme Court was most concerned with
whether preemption would further the purpose of ERISA. It held that attention to
the purpose was particularly important.
43 Travelers Insurance, 514 U.S. at 645.
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superseded absent a clear indication of congressional intent." The Court
further buttressed this deference to state police powers in De Buono v.
NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund. The Court held that when the
regulation is an area of traditional exercise of the state's police powers, the
party claiming preemption has the burden to prove that Congress did not
intend to supersede state law.45
The circuit courts have had some difficulty interpreting the Supreme
Court's decisions and have attempted to articulate tests to analyze whether
state law claims "relate to" ERISA and therefore preempted. The Fifth
Circuit's test says state law claims are not preempted where they do not
affect the "relations among the principal ERISA entities-the employer, the
plan, the plan fiduciaries, and the beneficiaries" or where "the state law
involves an exercise of traditional state authority."46 Other circuits have
followed and have developed similar criteria for ERISA preemption.47
44 Id. at 655.
4' De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814
(1997).
46 Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters.,
793 F.2d 1456, 1467 (5th Cir. 1986).
47 In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1989), the
Second Circuit noted that the term "relate to" should be interpreted broadly. It
stated that "ERISA does not preempt only state laws specifically designed to affect
employee benefit plans or dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA." Id.
at 144. The Eighth Circuit discussed a variety of factors to be considered when
determining whether the state law "relates to" an ERISA plan in Arkansas Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hospital, 947 F.2d 1341 (1991). It considered:
[W]hether the state law negates an ERISA plan provision, whether the state
law affects relations between primary ERISA entities, whether the state law
impacts the structure of ERISA plans, whether the state law impacts the
administration of ERISA plans, whether the state law has an economic
impact on ERISA plans, whether preemption of the state law is consistent
with other ERISA provisions, and whether the state law is an exercise of
traditional state power.
Id. at 1344-45 (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit listed the following four
categories of laws which are preempted because they "relate to" ERISA plans:
[L]aws that regulate the type of benefits or terms of ERISA plans....
[L]aws that create reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting requirements
for ERISA plans.... [L]aws that provide rules for the calculation of the
amount of benefits to be paid.... [L]aws and common-law rules that
provide remedies for misconduct growing out of the administration of the
ERISA plan.
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The term "plan" has been defined several different ways. In Donovan
v. Dillingham, the Eleventh Circuit held that a plan exists if"a reasonable
person can ascertain intended benefits, a class of beneficiaries, the source
of financing, and the procedures for receiving benefits."48 Alternatively, the
"functional test" examines "whether [the plan] is something Congress
intended to be governed by ERISA." '49 Most importantly, the Supreme
Court has held that ERISA only preempts "plans."' In Fort Halifax v.
Coyne, the Court specifically distinguished between "plans" and "benefits,"
holding that the former is preempted while the latter is not."'
The "savings clause" in ERISA provides that any state law that
regulates "insurance, banking, or securities" should not be preempted. 2 To
evaluate whether a law is "saved" by the clause, the Fourth Circuit said first
to "take what guidance is available from a 'common-sense' view of the
language of the savings clause itself."5 3 Second, the Circuit said to examine
the McCarran-Ferguson factors: (1) whether the practice has the effect of
"transferring or spreading the policyholder's risk," (2) whether the practice
"is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured," and (3) whether the practice is "limited to entities within the
insurance industry." 4 In order to survive preemption, a state law does not
need to "satisfy all three McCarran-Ferguson criteria.""5 To be saved by the
clause, however, the "law must not just have an impact on the insurance
industry, but must be specifically directed towards that industry."5 6 The
savings clause has proven to be as complicated an issue as the phrase
"relate to." While there has been little litigation on the banking and
securities exceptions, the insurance exception has been the basis for
Airparts Co., Inc. v. Custom Benefit Servs. ofAustin, 28 F.3d 1062,1064-65 (10th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Martori Bros. Distribs. v. James-Massengale, 781 F.2d 1349,
1356-57 (9th Cir. 1986)).
48 JAY CoNisoN, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 322-23 (1993) (citing Donovan v.
Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (1 1th Cir. 1982)).
491d. at 324.
'0 Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 8 (1987).
51Id. at8.
52 29 U.S.C. § 1 144(b)(2)(A) (2003).
53 Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 560 (4th Cir. 1994)
(citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1987)).
54 Id. at 560. The Court derived these factors from case law interpreting the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2003).
15 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 373 (2002), overruled
in part by Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003).56Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50.
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numerous cases.57 Because it is so controversial, a full discussion of the
savings clause is beyond the scope of this Note.
Some laws that meet the "savings clause" will nonetheless be
preempted by ERISA because they fall under the "deemer clause." ERISA
provides that "an employee benefit plan... shall [not] be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer... or to be engaged in the business of
insurance ... of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies.""8
The Supreme Court has read the deemer clause to "exempt self-funded
ERISA plans from state laws that 'regulat[e] insurance' within the meaning
of the savings clause." 9 The deemer clause does not engulf the savings
clause because "the savings clause retains the independent effect of
protecting state insurance regulation of insurance contracts purchased by
employee benefit plans."' Further, "a State may regulate [an insurance
plan] indirectly through regulation of its insurer and its insurer's insurance
contracts; if the plan is uninsured, the State may not regulate it."'"
B. Federal Common Law
When ERISA has preempted state common law and does not contain
provisions relating to this situation, the Supreme Court has interpreted
ERISA to authorize courts to develop and apply federal common law.62 The
courts may only create federal common law when it is appropriate under
the circumstances.63 Applying federal common law is inappropriate when
"its application would 1) conflict with the statutory provisions of ERISA;
2) discourage employers from implementing plans governed by ERISA; or
3) threaten to override the explicit terms of an established ERISA benefit
plan.'"4
C. State Common Law Doctrines of Substantial Compliance
Most states provide that if an insured person who is attempting to
change an insurance policy substantially complies with the particular policy
57 See ABA, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 804 (Steven J. Sacher et al. eds., 2000).
58 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2003).
59 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (alteration in original).
6' Id. at 64.
61 id.
62 Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 562 (4th Cir. 1994)
(citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109-11 (1989)).63 First Capital Life Ins. Co. v. AAA Communications, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 1546,
1557 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (citing Adams, 30 F.3d at 563 n.21).
64Id.
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requirements to make the change, the change will be effective. "Small
irregularities,.. . such as a failure to make a legible signature, or a failure
to attach a rider to a policy, do not prevent the effectiveness of the intended
change."65 Courts apply the doctrine of substantial compliance to "avoid
harsh results caused by a formalistic and overly technical adherence to the
exact words of a particular benefit plan's beneficiary designation provi-
sion(s)." 66 The "mere unexecuted intention on the part of the insured to
change his beneficiary," however, is not sufficient to make the change.6 '
"[T]he question as to what constitutes. . . substantial compliance depends
upon the particular provisions and circumstances involved.,
68
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON PREEMPTION AND
STATE COMMON LAW DOCTRINES OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
A. ERISA Does Not Preempt State Common Law Doctrines Regarding
Substantial Compliance
Two circuits have held that ERISA does not preempt state substantial
compliance doctrines for insurance policies. In their decisions, the two
circuit courts construed the breadth of ERISA's coverage narrowly. Since
the two courts applied state common law, they did not find it necessary to
discuss the application of federal common law.69
The Tenth Circuit was the first circuit court to consider this issue. In
Peckham v. Gem State Mutual, the court construed ERISA's preemptive
effect very narrowly and said ERISA only preempts state laws that
materially modify benefit plans. 70 Andrea Peckham, an employee of AAA
Engineering & Drafting, sued her insurance provider because the company
refused to cover expenses incurred by her newborn son who was born with
spina bifida and hydrocephalus." Under her policy there were two ways to
obtain coverage for a newborn baby, but Peckham failed to take the
65 44 AM. JUR. 2Dlnsurance § 1756 (2003).
66ERISA Does Not Preempt State Substantial Compliance Doctrine, Nev. Emp.
L. Letter, June 2000.
67 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Weatherford, No. 90-5585, 1991 WL 11611, at *6 (6th
Cir. Feb. 5, 1991) (quoting Jaudon v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 279 F.2d 730,
733 (6th Cir. 1960)).
68 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1756.
69 Bankamerica Pension Plan v. McMath, 206 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2002);
Peckham v. Gem State Mut., 964 F.2d 1043, 1052 (10th Cir. 1992).
70 Peckham, 964 F.2d at 1052.
71 Id. at 1046.
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necessary steps for either.72 As a result, the child was not covered by the
policy, and the family incurred great medical expenses.73 Among other
things, Peckham claimed that she had "substantially complied" with the
policy requirements.74 Before considering the merits of the substantial
compliance claim, the court evaluated whether ERISA preempts the state
common law doctrine of substantial compliance.75 The court held that "the
doctrine of substantial compliance does not denigrate from an ERISA plan
in a way that is significant enough to implicate the concerns underlying
ERISA preemption."76 The court then applied Oklahoma law to the claim
and dismissed it on its merits.77
In Bankamerica Pension Plan v. McMath, 8 the Ninth Circuit held that
the California common law doctrine of substantial compliance was not
preempted by ERISA.79 In this case, Clarence Montgomery, an employee
of Bank of America, submitted an unsigned beneficiary form for the 401 (k)
plan naming Alexander McMath as the beneficiary.80 Despite the omission
of a signature, the form was accepted. 81 After Montgomery's death, the
original beneficiaries and McMath all claimed they were entitled to
benefit.82 The 401 (k) plan administrator said that McMath was entitled to
benefit because the beneficiary form was valid despite the omission of the
signature.83 While the court held that Montgomery did not substantially
comply with the beneficiary designation requirements, it stated that in
general state common law doctrines of substantial compliance were not
preempted by ERISA.84 In its analysis, the court stated, "The current
ERISA preemption analysis provides that a law 'relates to' an employee
benefit plan if it has (1) a 'reference to,' or (2) a 'connection with' an
ERISA plan., 85 Further, the court found that "a state law has 'reference to'
72 id.
73 Id.
741d. at 1052.
75 id.
76 id.
77 Id. at 1052-53.
78 Bankamerica Pension Plan v. McMath, 206 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2000).
79 Id. at 830.
8 Id. at 823-24.
81 Id. at 824.
82 id.
83 id.
84 Id. at 830.
851 Id. at 829 (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997)).
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ERISA plans where it 'acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA
plans,. . . or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law's
operation."' 86 The court held that California's doctrine of substantial
compliance clearly did not fall under this definition. 7 To determine
whether a law has a "connection with" an ERISA plan, the court said to
look at "'both the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope
of the state law...' and 'the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA
plans.' "88 Following the court in Peckham, the Ninth Circuit held that "the
doctrine of substantial compliance does not frustrate any of [ERISA's]
objectives." 9 In addition, the court found that "the state law doctrine of
substantial compliance would not affect the administration of the plan.
Rather, it would aid in determining the identity of the recipient of the
proceeds." 90 Since the doctrine of substantial compliance only affected the
ownership of the benefits, the "connection with ERISA [was] too 'tenuous,
remote or peripheral' to trigger preemption." 91
B. ERISA Does Preempt State Common Law Doctrines of Substantial
Compliance
In contrast, two circuits held that state common law doctrines of
substantial compliance are preempted by ERISA.92 Both of these circuit
courts made and applied federal common law to fill in the gaps of ERISA.
In addition, a few district courts have also discussed this issue and found
that ERISA preempts state common law on the issue of substantial
compliance. 93 While the Sixth Circuit has not specifically decided whether
ERISA preempts state common law doctrines of substantial compliance, it
has discussed a related issue and held that ERISA preempts state common
law.
94
86 Id. (quoting Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at 325).
87 id.
88Id. (quoting Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at 324).
891d.
90Id.
' Id. at 830 (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)).92 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2002); Phoenix
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 561 (4th Cir. 1994).
93See, e.g., Harpole v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1158-59 (E.D.
Ark. 2002); First Capital Life Ins. Co. v. AAA Communications, Inc., 906 F. Supp.
1546, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1995). But see Klover v. Antero Healthplans, 64 F. Supp. 2d
1003 (D. Colo. 1999) (holding that the Tenth Circuit rulings are binding in that
ERISA does not preempt state common law doctrines of substantial compliance).
94 Tinsley v. Gen. Motors, Inc., 227 F.3d 700, 703-04 (6th Cir. 2000).
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In Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Adams, the Fourth Circuit
rejected the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Peckham, holding that ERISA does
preempt South Carolina's common law doctrine of substantial com-
pliance.95 In this case the insured, Bill Adams, remarried and wanted to
change the beneficiary on his life insurance policy to his new wife.96 He
filled out a "dual-purpose" form to change the medical insurance to include
his new step-daughter but failed to indicate what actions he wanted taken
with respect to his life insurance beneficiary.97 He later spoke to the
Financial Accounting Manager for his employer, who had responsibility for
some of the employees' benefits, about changing the beneficiary on his
policy. 8 For unknown reasons, however, the manager failed to make the
changes and left the company before Adams died.9
The Fourth Circuit criticized the Tenth Circuit's definition of "relate
to" saying that it was "unduly restrictive."'100 Relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,'0 1 the court held
that the phrase "relate to" should have a "broad common-sense meaning
such that a state law 'relate[s] to' a benefit plan 'in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.' ,102 Further,
the court held that the doctrine is not incorporated in the savings clause,
which "allows the operation of state law despite ERISA in specified areas
such as the insurance industry when the law in question 'regulates' that
area."'13 The court held that "South Carolina's substantial compliance
doctrine... does not 'regulate' insurance" because it was not "specifically
directed toward the insurance industry."'' 4
Recently, the Seventh Circuit held that ERISA preempts Illinois'
common law doctrine of substantial compliance." 5 In Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Johnson, an employee, Jimmie Johnson, named his wife
at the time as beneficiary.0 6 After they divorced, Johnson named LaShanda
Smith, Leonard Smith, and Carolyn Hall as beneficiaries.0 7 When he made
9 Adams, 30 F.3d at 560.
96 Id. at 557.
971d.
98 Id.
9 Id.
10Id. at 560.
"I Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
02 Adams, 30 F.3d at 560 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47-48).
'
0 3 Id. at 560.
104 1d. at 561 (citing Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50).
101 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2002).
1061d. at 560.
107 Id.
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this change, however, Johnson checked a box for a plan in which he was
not enrolled, listed his mother's address instead of his own, and indicated
that he was separated instead of divorced. 18 Upon his death, the employer,
General Electric, contacted his former wife and informed her that she was
the beneficiary, but the Smiths and Hall also claimed the proceeds of the
life insurance policy.'l 9
To decide whether he effectively changed the beneficiary form, the
Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of "whether ERISA preempts a state's
substantial compliance doctrine because the doctrine 'relates to' an ERISA
plan.""' The court discussed the decisions from the Ninth, Tenth, and
Fourth Circuits on the issue."' In addition, the court relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision in Egelhoffv. Egelhoff. 2 The Seventh Circuit
held that since the "identity of that beneficiary clearly 'relates to' ERISA
insofar as it 'governs the payment of benefits, a central matter of plan
administration,'" the common law doctrine of substantial compliance was
preempted.' The court stated, "Egelhoff stands for the proposition that a
state law cannot invalidate an ERISA plan beneficiary designation by
mandating distribution to another person. Similarly... the application of
the legal doctrine of substantial compliance mandates a conclusion as to the
identity of the proper recipient of such payments."' The court also
reasoned, "It is thus very different from state laws which may have an
incidental effect on ERISA plans, but which do not mandate certain choices
or conclusions."' '15
While the Sixth Circuit has not specifically considered whether ERISA
preempts state common law doctrines of substantial compliance. However,
the court's holding in Tinsley v. General Motors, Inc. suggests that if faced
with the issue, it would find that ERISA preempts state common law
doctrines of substantial compliance. "6 Since the court's decision in Tinsley,
one district court in the Sixth Circuit has used the decision to justify
preemption of state common law doctrines of substantial compliance."'
'08 Id. at 560-61
'9Id. at 561.
"o ld. at 565.
"'Id. at 565-66.
12 Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
"13 Johnson, 297 F.3d at 566 (quoting Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148).
1141id.
115 Id.
116 Tinsley v. Gen. Motors, Inc., 227 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2000).
117 See Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Leeson, No. 00-CV-1394, 2002 WL 483563,
at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19,2002) (finding that "the substantial compliance doctrine
'relates to' the ERISA plan" and that "the substantial compliance doctrine is not
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In Tinsley, the employee, Edward Williams, initially designated his
niece, Willie Lee Tinsley, as the beneficiary of his life insurance plan with
the General Motors Life Insurance and Disability Program." '8 He subse-
quently changed the beneficiary to Bevlah Calloway, his caretaker." 9 After
Williams died, both Tinsley and Calloway claimed benefits under the
plan. '2 Tinsley sued General Motors claiming that Williams was under
undue influence by Calloway when he changed the beneficiary on his life
insurance plan.
12'
The district court applied Michigan law to Tinsley's claims, but the
circuit court found that federal law governed "because [the case] involve[d]
an employee welfare benefit plan that [was] governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act.' 22 The court found that since the claim
concerned the "legitimacy of the beneficiary designation,"12 it was
governed by ERISA pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Metropol-
itan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 24 which stated, ERISA "'provides an
exclusive federal cause of action for resolution of such disputes.' ,,125 The
court also noted that in the past, it has held that "claims touching on the
designation of a beneficiary of an ERISA-governed plan fall under
ERISA's broad preemptive reach and are consequently governed by federal
law."'26
III. ERISA SHOULD PREEMPT STATE
COMMON LAW DOCTRINES OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
Preemption of state common law doctrines of substantial compliance
by ERISA is proper for two reasons. First, preemption is in accord with the
Supreme Court's past decisions. Second, a main purpose of ERISA is to
saved from ERISA preemption" by the savings clause). The court used Tinsley to
justify using federal common law to determine whether the employee had
"substantially complied" with the policy requirements. Id. at *4-5.
"I Tinsley, 227 F.3d at 702.
119 Id.
120 id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 703.
"' Id. at 704.
124 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
125 Tinsley, 227 F.3d at 704 (quoting Taylor, 481 U.S. at 62-63).
1
26 Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 119 F.3d 415,420 (6th Cir. 1997);
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Pressley, 82 F.3d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1996); McMillan v.
Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir. 1990)).
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guarantee a national set of standards for regulation of employee benefit
plans. To fulfill this purpose, ERISA must preempt the state common law
doctrines of substantial compliance. The Fourth Circuit's substantial
compliance test is the appropriate federal common law to apply.
A. Supreme Court Decisions
Past Supreme Court decisions indicate that ERISA should preempt state
common law doctrines of substantial compliance because the doctrines
meet the elements of the preemption clause. The Court's decisions in
Egelhoffv. Egelhoff,' Shaw v. Delta AirLines,128 and Pilot Life Insurance
Co. v. Dedeaux 129 support a rule of preemption because of the broad
definition of "relate to." Conversely, state common law doctrines of
substantial compliance do not fall under the narrow exceptions to the
phrase "relate to" noted in California Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction ofNorth America, Inc. 130 and New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.' Finally, state common law doctrines of substantial
compliance are not "saved" by ERISA's "savings clause."
State common law doctrines of substantial compliance fulfill the
elements required by ERISA for preemption. First, the doctrines meet the
definition of a "state law" according to ERISA because they are decisions
and rules that have "the effect of law." Second, in that employee benefit
plans are being examined, the common law doctrines "relate to" the plans.
The Supreme Court emphasized the expansiveness of the preemption clause
and the phrase "relate to" in both Shaw and Pilot Life. In Shaw, the Court
defined "relate to" as having "a connection with or reference to such a
plan."' 32 The phrase was given meaning in its "broad sense."' 33 In Pilot
Life, the Court said that state law is preempted "even if the law is not
specifically designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only indirect."' 34
127 Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
128 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
129 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
130 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519
U.S. 316 (1997).
131 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
132 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
133 Id. at 98.
134 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) (citing Pilot
Life, 481 U.S. at 47).
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Furthermore, the phrase "relate to" is quite broad because "as many a
curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything
else."'35 Finally, in Egelhoff, the Court said that the identity of the
beneficiary "relates to" ERISA because it "governs the payment of benefits,
a central matter of plan administration."' 36 Since state common law doc-
trines of substantial compliance also govern the payment of benefits, they
"relate to" an employee benefits plan. 37
Insofar as the Supreme Court has retreated from its originally expansive
definition of "relate to," it is not enough to exclude common law doctrines
of substantial compliance. In Travelers Insurance, the Court held that a
state statute requiring hospitals to collect a surcharge from certain patients
whose insurance coverage was purchased by their employers under an
ERISA plan, but not other patients who were insured by Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, was not preempted because the statute did not "relate to" an
employee benefit plan.' The court held that the statute did not "relate to"
an ERISA plan because the economic effect on ERISA plans was indirect
and it was unlikely that Congress intended "to displace general health care
regulation, which historically has been a matter of local concern."' 39
Dillingham Construction provided that a state "prevailing wage" statute
was not preempted by ERISA. 40 The state law at issue regulated an
apprenticeship plan. 41 In its decision, the Court considered the objectives
of ERISA and noted that apprenticeship standards and the wages paid had
long been regulated by states. 42 Most importantly, the "prevailing wage
statute alter[ed] the incentives, but [did] not dictate the choices, facing
ERISA plans.' 43 State common law doctrines of substantial compliance are
different from the exceptions provided in Travelers Insurance and
Dillingham Construction. The common law doctrines are not concerned
135Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at 335 (Scalia, J., concurring).
136 Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001).
137 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 566 (2002) (finding the
distinction made by the Ninth Circuit that state common law doctrines of
substantial compliance do not relate to an ERISA plan because it "would merely
'aid in determining the identity of the proper recipient of the proceeds"' (quoting
Bankamerica Pension Plan v. McMath, 206 F.3d 821, 829 (9th Cir. 2000))).
138 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
139 Id. at 661-62.
14 Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at 334.
1411d. at 319.
142 Id. at 325-30.
143 Id. at 334.
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with indirect economic effects on the employers and they have not been "a
matter of local concern" historically so they do meet the "relate to"
element.
Finally, the state common law doctrines of substantial compliance do
not fall under ERISA's "savings clause." As the Fourth Circuit noted, a
"common sense view of the word 'regulates"' means that "a law must not
just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically
directed toward that industry.'" The common law doctrines of substantial
compliance apply to many areas of the law, not just insurance. Therefore,
the doctrines are not directed at the insurance industry. Additionally, as the
Fourth Circuit noted, an application of the McCarran-Ferguson factors does
not provide reconciliation with the doctrines.1 41 State common law
doctrines of substantial compliance do not spread policy-holder risks, they
are not an integral part of the policy relationship between the insured and
the insurer, and are not directed at the insurance industry.
B. Purpose of ERISA
"An important objective of ERISA is to maintain a nationally uniform
administration practice."'" In order to successfully accomplish this objec-
tive, ERISA must preempt state law and common law doctrines such as the
doctrine of substantial compliance.
The Supreme Court discussed the purposes ofERISA in Ingersoll-Rand
Co. v. McClendon.' It stated that, according to its understanding, ERISA
"was intended to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to
a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative
and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States
or between States and the Federal Government."' 148 If the employee benefit
plans were not subject to a uniform body of law, then "the inefficiencies
created could work to the detriment of the plan beneficiaries."'4 9 The Court
'44Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554,561 (1994) (quoting Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987)).
145Id.
',"Jonathan Dotson, Note, Egelhoffv. Egelhoff: The Supreme Court's Latest
Attempt to Clarify ERISA Preemption and the Decision's Effect on Texas State
Law, 54 BAYLOR L. REv. 503, 515 (2002) (citing Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at
326-27).
147 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
' Id. at 142.
149Id.
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also noted in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines 5' that ERISA's legislative history
contains evidence that Congress intended for the preemptive scope to be
broad. 5 The Court quoted Representative Dent as stating, "'Finally, I
wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement of this
legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate
the field of employee benefit plans."" 52 The Court also quoted Senator
Williams who stressed that the "narrow exceptions specified in the bill"
should eliminate "'the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local
regulation of employee benefit plans.'"'"3 Further, Senator Williams
stated, "'This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all
actions of State or local governments,... which have the force or effect of
law.' "9154
In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, the Supreme Court gave guidance about the
type of law that would frustrate the purpose of ERISA. The Court found the
Washington statute at issue had "a prohibited connection with ERISA plans
because it interfere [d] with nationally uniform plan administration."'55 The
Court was concerned because, as a result of the state statute, plan adminis-
trators could not "make payments simply by identifying the beneficiary
specified by the plan documents."' 56 This type of situation "[r]equiring
ERISA administrators to master the relevant laws of 50 States and to
contend with litigation would undermine the congressional goal of
'minimiz[ing] the administrative and financial burden[s]' on plan adminis-
trators."'5 Similarly, the state common law doctrines of substantial
compliance would require a plan administrator to learn the common law of
fifty states in order to distribute the benefits of an insurance plan. The
administrator could not simply rely on the names listed on the plan
documents. Instead, the administrator would have to consult the common
law of several states. This is a great frustration of the purpose of ERISA.
In order for the intent of Congress to be fulfilled and for the purpose and
objective of ERISA to be satisfied, the state common law doctrines of
substantial compliance must be preempted.
150 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
51Id. at 98.
152Id. at 99.
153 Id.
154 id.
155 Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001).
156 Id. (citations omitted).
'57 Id. at 149-50 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142
(1990)).
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IV. FEDERAL COMMON LAW
If a court finds that ERISA preempts state common law on substantial
compliance, it must decide what law to apply. Most create and apply
federal common law to the situation. Courts are permitted to create federal
common law to fill gaps in ERISA.58 "The basis for development of the
federal common law of ERISA is that Congress intentionally delegated to
the federal courts broad power to create rights and obligations that are
consistent with ERISA's underlying purposes.... 15 9 Since ERISA does
not provide for instances of substantial compliance, the courts can and
should formulate a test to be applied to cases dealing with the issue.
The Fourth Circuit laid out a federal test for substantial compliance that
the Seventh Circuit adopted:
[A]n insured substantially complies with the change of beneficiary
provisions of an ERISA life insurance policy when the insured: (1)
evidences his or her intent to make the change and (2) attempts to
effectuate the change by undertaking positive action which is for all
practical purposes similar to the action required by the change of
beneficiary provisions of the policy. 
160
The Fourth Circuit's test includes "evidence of intent and substantial
completion of the benefit change process but notably omits the 'all he could
have done' element" used by the Ninth Circuit in Bankamerica Pension
Plan v. McMath.'
61
The Fourth Circuit adopted the proper test for substantial compliance
under federal common law. This test is a synthesis of the general principles
of substantial compliance, and it provides the best results for employees
and employers. Furthermore, the test is a common sense approach to the
problem of substantial compliance. Despite the fact that a court applying
state law would often reach the same result as if it had applied federal
common law, preemption is "not precluded simply because a state law is
5' Michael J. Collins, The Federal Common Law ofERISA, in NYU INSTITUTE
ON FEDERAL TAXATION § 16.01, 16-3 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983)).
159 Id.
60 Davis v. Combes, 294 F.3d 931,941 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Phoenix Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 564 (4th Cir. 1994)).
161 Id. (citing Bankamerica Pension Plan v. McMath, 206 F.3d 821 (9th Cir.
2000)).
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consistent with ERISA."'62 Therefore, the court must go through the
preemption test and then apply federal common law to the case.
Formulating and applying federal common law to these cases "does not
constitute a [material] modification of the ERISA plan."'63 Therefore, it is
not prohibited by 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) which prevents "the court from
modifying or supplementing an ERISA plan."'" Instead, the doctrine
simply assists "the court in determining whether conduct should, in reality,
be considered the equivalent of compliance under the contract."'65
Furthermore, "it does not conflict with ERISA's statutory provisions
because ERISA is silent on the matter."'
V. CONCLUSION
ERISA should preempt state common law doctrines of substantial
compliance. Congress' goal to provide a uniform set of rules for employers
is the best justification for preemption. In addition, preemption is in
accordance with the recent Supreme Court decisions regarding ERISA.
Even if a court could reach the same conclusion when applying the state
common law doctrines of substantial compliance as when preempting the
state doctrines, it is important for the courts to.be consistent with ERISA
preemption. The Fourth and the Seventh Circuits have taken the correct
approach to this issue and the other circuits should follow their lead.
Finally, when ERISA preempts the state common law doctrines of
substantial compliance the courts should develop federal common law as
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have done.
162 Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 139 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
163 Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 563 (1994).
16 Id. at 562.
165 Id. at 563 (citing Peckham v. Gem State Mut., 964 F.2d 1043, 1052 (10th
Cir. 1992)).
166Id.
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